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Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson said it very simply: "We are not final because we are
infallible; but we are infallible only because we are final." Prof. Yanal's paper says it at
somewhat greater length, raising provocative questions about this unsettling structure of
authority in our legal system. Contrary to everything we know about human nature, and
notwithstanding two centuries of judicial atrocities, there is a sense in which the nine Justices of
the United States Supreme Court can never be wrong. This paradox flies in the face of
unrelenting press and popular criticism of actual Supreme Court decisions, culminating in the
notorious Bush v. Gore decision of last December. At my university, our best undergraduates
start losing sleep when they first catch a whiff of the problem Prof. Yanal lays before us. Even
worse than this creepy infallibility is the thought that the same judges who were infallible in case
A can turn around and get the law wrong in case B, not because of any loss of legal wisdom, but
simply because one of their four compatriots from Case A votes with the other side in Case B.
There is something deeply wrong with this picture.
Prof. Yanal's paper doesn't attempt to say what is wrong with it. He acknowledges all the
appropriate discomfort with the problem, but his task is more analytical. His paper makes the
following hypothetical point: to the extent that one accepts the infallibility perspective, one must
abandon many other perspectives—including some very attractive ones. Above all, one must
abandon the critique of cases like Bowers v. Hardwick, which belongs in the select company of
Roe v. Wade, Brown v. Board of Education, and Lochner v. New York as paradigmatic failures in
the eyes of vocal critics. Of course, there are some legal philosophies that make this infallibility
principle more than just hypothetical. Legal positivism and legal realism seem to embrace it, but
then must deal with the resulting dissonance it creates for people of common sense.
The consequences of not granting infallibility may be worse than we think. If a majority of
the Supreme Court can be second-guessed on a matter of constitutional law, we have to look
beyond the passive voice to inquire exactly who will be doing the second-guessing. If someone
else can correct them on matters of law, then everyone else can do so, and legal authority is
eventually subdivided among competing interest groups. Ronald Dworkin began taking rights
seriously back in the days when critics were bashing the Warren Court, using the subtle
argument that judges were not necessarily fallible, just because their critics said they made
mistakes.
Legal philosophers have explored every conceivable aspect of this important dilemma built
into living legal systems. Quite simply, the standards of legitimacy are different from the
standards of finality, a difference that is guaranteed to show up at the top of the legal hierarchy.
This is true whether it is a Supreme Court or Parliament that has the final say. Philosophers have
grabbed onto either horn of this dilemma and learned to live with the consequences: those who
seize legitimacy move toward natural law theories; those who seize finality become positivists.
I am going to leave this philosophical debate in the capable hands of Prof. Yanal and address
some consequences for rhetoric. The 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick provides an excellent
example of courts under pressure to reconcile their two distinct functions: to have the last word,
and to make it convincing. In my view, both the majority and the dissent in this case display
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precisely the same rhetorical strengths and weaknesses. They both fall short of squaring the
judicial circle, not because of incompetence or moral slacking, but because judicial arguments
always fall short of achieving deductive certainty. There are very few constitutional cases where
the rhetorical consequences are as obvious and unsettling as in Bowers.
The most striking fact about this case, from a technical point of view, is the shortage of
precedents available to both sides. There were only three or four prior cases for guidance,
perhaps as many as six if you stretch it. The prior cases, in turn, were based on scant authority,
and were highly controversial in their own right. This contrasts with judicial lawmaking in
standard common law situations, where there are potentially hundreds of prior cases from which
to draw analogies and principles. If there is a problem here, it is that American society has
demanded that its judicial system provide answers for contentious cultural issues—not just any
old answers, but definitive, absolute, and final answers, even when cultural battles are still
raging. We turn to the courts for closure on questions involving sexuality and reproductive
choices, but of course we want closure on our terms, not those of our most vocal opponents.
The Bowers case asked the Supreme Court to call the question on homosexuality.
Everything about this case is unusual and intriguing, including the Dickensian name of the
plaintiff, Michael Hardwick, who filed a preemptive lawsuit against the state of Georgia, to
prevent them from prosecuting him for sodomy. The prosecution had already decided not to file
charges against him, but Hardwick imagined that the shocking and intrusive police action that
caught him in the act of oral sex would gain the sympathy of the courts, which he hoped would
send a symbolic message to the homophobes. The unique power of the courts to combine
legitimacy and finality make them an attractive medium for sending messages to one's enemies.
But first you have to win your case.
Was Hardwick's behavior protected under the Constitution? The judges had only a handful
of precedents to consult, including a case that concerned married couples using contraceptives,
and the abortion case. There was another case about police invading a private home and seizing
pornographic films, and other such singular matters. In pondering these cases, everything
depends on the level of generality at which one reads them. If the contraception case was just a
contraception case, then it is hard to see that it has much to do with homosexual behavior. If, on
the other hand, one reads that earlier case as a strong cultural message that people should be free
to do whatever they want, then it means that homosexuals should be free to do whatever they
want.
Here is the crux of the case, from a rhetorical aspect. If you take these few precedents and
interpret each one at the lowest possible level of specificity, they simply do not add up to victory
for Michael Hardwick. If instead you interpret each prior case at its highest level of rhetorical
flight, then Hardwick is well within the zone of protection. Each of the precedents was highly
problematic in itself. In the abortion case, Roe v. Wade, the Court was not clear whether its
decision was about freedom in general, or merely about a specific right for women and/or their
physicians to choose abortion during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. The ambiguity was
carefully calculated. Courts are accustomed to manipulating the level of generality in their
interpretation of past cases, but normally they have so many precedents to interpret that they can
bury their inventive craft in a string of citations.
The legitimacy of legal method depends on taking past cases as we find them, and not
manipulating the cases retrospectively to create the precedents we want. If we are going to grant
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finality to some public body, we want that body to display rhetorical restraint, not openly invent
premises to match some preconceived conclusion. The majority and dissenting opinions in
Bowers read exactly like legal briefs in an adversarial battle. The majority parrots the narrow
readings of precedent advocated by the state of Georgia; while the dissent adopts Hardwick's
very broad interpretations. As Ronald Dworkin might say, you and I are not in a position to
prove that either group of judges was necessarily wrong. But, more important, neither side can
persuade the other that its interpretation is fair, balanced, and legitimate—and deserving of
finality.
I end up at the same place with Prof. Yanal. The Supreme Court has the final say on
interpretations of law, but their authority makes us uneasy and distrustful. When the rhetorical
ropes and pulleys reveal too much of the backstage manipulation, we begin to ask ourselves if
judicial supremacy is such a great idea. Many of us asked ourselves that question last December,
when the Court intervened in the presidential election. Our alternative, of course, is something
like legislative supremacy, but we will leave that topic for another day.

